FISA and the Independent Judiciary

All the executive-branch access to phone records and whatnot only concerns me a little. The fact is that we live in public, and efforts to guarantee that all our conversations -- though held while walking down the street -- are perfectly secret are misplaced.

On the other hand, these things do need to be watched carefully, and we have people in place with the legal and constitutional authority to do all the necessary watching: judges. As long as we require the executive to ask a judge before wiretaps are secured or records are collected, we should be fine ... as long as the judges do their jobs. If the judges see themselves not as independent arbiters but as extensions of the executive, we do have a serious problem.


The courts established by the Foreign Intelligence Security Act have blurred that important line. The very fact that their decisions are secret and that they do not have to publish their rationale is a problem. Courts should never operate in secret. Whether the judges like it or not, when they work out of the public eye, they are more liable to be considered "rubber stamps" for the government.

Now concerns arise about how judges get the job in the first place. While Republicans block nominations by the President all the time, they have no say over FISA court appointments; Chief Justice Roberts makes those appointments, and recent analysis suggests that he puts people on the court who are even more likely than most to approve of government surveillance.

FISA courts ought to operate within very narrow parameters. Mostly, open court proceedings are better. But even within those confines, they need to work under the system of checks. What they are doing now is not good enough.